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With its GDP per capita being high enough and already approaching Western Europe an 
averages, the Republic of Cyprus appears to be one of the best candidates for European 
Union (EU) membership and its negotiators are making rapid progress in accession 
negotiations with Brussels. Yet, the continuing stand -off between the island’s Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriot community raises questions as to the exact status under which Cyprus 
will soon accede to the EU.  The article addresses this problem and outlines what seems 
most likely to happen with the signing of the accession agreement. Given that the issue 
might crucially affect the way the European order of the near future will be shaped, the 
article also discusses the implications Cyprus ’  accession could possibly have on EU-
Turkey relations and the future of the European Security and Defence Poli cy (ESDP). 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
While all eyes have generally been focused on the new phase of enlargement of the 
European Union (EU), the imminent signing of the agreement for the accession of 
Cyprus has begun to demand urgent attention. It is still rather surprising that most 
discussions on the nature of what is expected to be the new European regional order 
limit themselves to the cost of enlargement and public support whereas the 
significance of the seemingly intractable ‘Cyprus Problem’ is rarely mentioned in this 
context. This article examines the unavoidable dilemmas European policy-makers are 
confronted with regarding the status of Cyprus’ full EU membership. It then addresses 
the question of what consequences the accession of the island might have on vital 
issues such as the development of EU-Turkey relations and the diplomatic efforts to 
get in place the arrangements for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).  
Because it would be imprudent to search for final answers, the article can simply hope 
to improve scholarly awareness and understanding of the issues involved. Therefore, 
it proceeds by way of suggestion rather than conclusive argument and any ‘raw 
building blocks of evidence’ are disposed in such a manner as to move propositions 
forward. 
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II. Cyprus’  EU Membership as a Catalyst for a Solution to the Island’s  
Political Problem 
 
But how can such a small island situated in the north-western tip of the Mediterranean 
be so important to EU politics? To answer this question one has to start by outlining 
what has become known as the ‘Cyprus Problem’. The Republic of Cyprus was 
established at independence in 1960. But power sharing and political cooperation 
between majority Greek- and minority Turkish-Cypriots quickly broke down, leading 
to a decade of sporadic but intense ethnic violence. Following a Turkish military 
invasion in 1974 there ensued an internal movement of populations with Greek-
Cypriots fleeing south from the advancing Turkish army and Turkish-Cypriots 
gathering in the north. By the end of 1975 Turkish-Cypriots (comprising 18 per cent 
of the population) held some 37 per cent of the island north of a divide line and were 
backed by a garrison of 30,000 Turkish troops and a steady stream of mainland 
Turkish settlers. Despite the catastrophic consequences for their community, Greek-
Cypriots took comfort from the fact that, unlike the Turkish Cypriot administration, 
the government of the Republic of Cyprus (now exclusively in Greek-Cypriot hands) 
continued to be recognized as the legitimate government of the island and, therefore, 
retained the advantages of international legitimacy and access.  Repeated diplomatic 
efforts to find a political solution that would reconcile Greek-Cypriot demands for 
restoration with Turkish-Cypriot insistence that the ‘sovereignty’ and security of its 
community be guaranteed ended in failure. Having been frustrated with what they 
perceived to be the lack of Turkish-Cypriot political will to regulate the problem, 
Greek-Cypriots gradually begun to emphasize the prospect of EU (then European 
Community, EC) membership for the whole of Cyprus in the hope that this could 
provide a sufficient framework for resolving the island’s enduring communal dispute. 
By the same token in 1990 the government of the Republic of Cyprus applied for EU 
membership. 
The situation in Cyprus headed towards another serious crisis when in 1993 the 
European Commission concluded that the Republic of Cyprus’ application for EU 
membership was made in the name of the whole island (namely both Greek- and 
Turkish-Cypriots).  Brussels’ decision to accept the candidacy of Cyprus provoked the 
angry reaction of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which claimed that the government 
of the Republic of Cyprus did not have the right to apply for membership without 
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consulting it. The Turkish-Cypriots also made it abundantly clear that they would 
never agree to Cyprus joining a grouping of countries of which Greece was a member 
but Turkey was not. The issue had regional implications, too, because Greek and 
Turkish interests and policies on the EU-Cyprus membership issue ran counter to each 
other. While being warmly received by the Greek government, the decision of the 
European Commission provoked a host of threats by the Turkish government who 
went as far as to claim that regional stability would be severely jeopardized by Cyprus 
accession to the EU. To counter these threats EU officials tried, albeit unsuccessfully, 
to use the prospect of EU membership to make an eventual settlement of the political 
problem more attractive to the Turkish-Cypriots. To this end they argued that 
Turkish-Cypriots would reap the considerable benefits of EU citizenship and benefit 
disproportionately in economic terms. 
In the expectation of significant progress in the United Nations (UN) talks for a 
settlement, the European Commission finally decided to consider Cyprus as eligible 
for membership. In March 1995 the General Affairs Council confirmed the island’s 
suitability and established that accession negotiations with Cyprus would start six 
months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). A structured 
dialogue was also initiated in order to reveal areas where Cyprus had to make efforts 
to adapt to the EU’s legal system and policies. At the same time top officials of 
several member states stated unequivocally that they would not welcome Cyprus in 
the EU before the political problem on the island was comprehensively resolved. 
In 1997 the European Council in Luxembourg confirmed that accession 
negotiations would begin in the spring of 1998 and the Turkish-Cypriots were invited 
to participate in the Cypriot delegation. Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, 
however, flatly refused President Glafcos Clerides’ invitation for Turkish-Cypriots to 
join the island’s negotiating team and reiterated his position that he opposed accession 
into the EU, fearing it would downgrade Turkey’s presence on the island and relegate 
the Turkish-Cypriot community to a minority status. Despite the Turkish-Cypriot 
refusal to take any part, accession negotiations started in March 1998 while 
substantial talks for the adoption and the implementation of the EU legislation began 
a few months later. 
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III. The Helsinki Summit in December 1999 
 
But Cyprus’ EU membership, initially conceived by European and other diplomats as 
a catalyst for a solution, now emerged as a serious headache for the EU. For its part, 
Turkey had made it clear that it would annex the northern part of Cyprus if the EU 
admitted the Greek-Cypriots as the Republic of Cyprus without a settlement. On the 
other hand, Greece had threatened to use its veto power over EU enlargement unless 
the Republic of Cyprus was included in the first wave of enlargement. A glimmer of 
hope arose with the European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999.  
Parallel to its recognition of Turkey as a candidate for membership (with Greece’s 
blessing) the EU implicitly confirmed that the solution of the Cyprus problem was no 
longer a prerequisite for the admission of Cyprus: 
 
The Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of 
Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will 
be made without the above being a precondition.  In this the Council will take 
account for all relevant factors.  
(EU Archives 2000). 
 
The Helsinki outcome was meant to serve multiple purposes.  The promise that the 
division of Cyprus would not be an obstacle to EU membership was made mainly to 
appease Greece (by refusing to negotiate, the Turkish side could no longer block 
Cyprus’ accession to the EU)1 and enable the bloc to nominate more candidates for 
membership, thus making sure that enlargement would indeed happen.  The decision 
to offer candidacy to Turkey primarily aimed to reinforce Turkey’s European 
orientation and provide a strong incentive for Ankara to pursue economic, political 
and human rights reform. Given that Turkey was perhaps the party which held the key 
to a political solution in Cyprus, its own accession prospects would encourage it to 
soften its tone over the issue. Helsinki also intended to eliminate much of the deep 
resentment that many Turks felt toward the EU following the December 1997 
Luxembourg summit’s rejection of Turkey’s candidacy, and bolster Greek-Turkish 
relations. 
                                                
1 The decision essentially meant that the EU refused to hand Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots a tactical 
advantage by making Cyprus’ accession conditional on a settlement –  in this way, by refusing to 
negotiate, the Turkish side would be rewarded with the ability to block Cyprus ’ accession to the EU.  
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IV. Negotiations to Resolve the Political Problem of Cyprus after Helsinki:  
Yet Another Deadlock 
 
The Helsinki decision was evidently built on a delicate and fragile balance with 
Turkey and Greece, each assuming that the other would ultimately step back from the 
brink. The evolution of Greece-Turkey relations following the Helsinki summit was 
remarkable and Greek and Turkish foreign ministers George Papandreou and Ismail 
Cem engaged in their version of a rapprochement.  Many of the bilateral agreement –
on trade and investment, organized crime, illegal immigration, tourism and the 
environment –  the two countries signed were substantively significant.  But perhaps 
even more important was the demonstration of the two neighbours’ common interests 
even in sensitive foreign policy issues such as that of Cyprus. As Hikmet Cetin, a 
former Turkish foreign minister put it, “people in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus now see 
that the two governments can deal with each other in a positive way” (cited in Gordon 
2000: 8). 
Under these circumstances in August 2000 the UN launched proximity talks to 
try and bring the two communities of Cyprus together.  But despite the newly found 
optimism of everybody involved in the Cyprus conflict those talks broke down in 
November 2000, when Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktash –  having received the 
backing of Ankara –  walked out in protest at not being recognized as a legitimate 
head of government. Denktash adamantly insisted on his ideas of a confederation (that 
is of two states) something which went against the wish of the EU (and the Greek-
Cypriots) that Cyprus remained one state.  
What appeared to be a brief ‘honeymoon’ effectively ended with the breakdown 
of the talks. Greece promptly reconfirmed its threat of a veto while Turkey hardened 
its own stance by proposing a two-state formula for Cyprus. Turkish foreign minister 
Cem unveiled the new Turkish position during a Turkey-European parliamentary 
committee meeting in June 2001 and said that the Turkey-EU relationship would face 
serious setbacks if Cyprus became an EU member without a solution (Dogan 2001).   
The collapse of talks was not received well by the EU. A settlement might have 
no longer been a precondition for Cyprus’ accession, but failure to reach one by the 
time the island was due to join was not the optimal choice of several EU member 
states given the problems such a scenario would introduce into the EU. After a long 
period of inactivity, and following intense diplomatic efforts, in December 2001 
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Denktash agreed to resume the talks, reportedly at the urging of the Turkish General 
Staff and Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. With the Republic of Cyprus demonstrating 
its ability to assume the obligations of membership and nearing the successful 
completion of the negotiating process, Clerides and Denktash started to meet as 
representatives of their communities, and set June 2002 as a deadline for the 
conclusion of the talks. The resumption of negotiations eased tensions at a time when 
Turkish-EU relations appeared to be heading for a crisis. Hopes were once again 
expressed that the talks would have a positive outcome, which would prove beneficial 
both for the Greek- and the Turkish-Cypriot community in view of the island’s EU 
accession. But after three rounds of direct negotiation under UN auspices and despite 
the visit to Cyprus of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as part of his Good 
Offices Mission, the target of reaching a settlement by June 2002 has evidently not 
been met. Although no-one has openly admitted that the talks are in a deadlock, it is 
quite obvious that up to now there have not been such openings so that one might say 
there is substantial progress on the basic principles of the Cyprus issue. 
 
V. The EU dilemma 
 
Cyprus’ EU membership, which for many circles in Europe initially appeared to offer 
the best hopes to help reintegrate the divided island, has now emerged as a pressing 
problem for the EU. From an objective point of view Cyprus leads all other countries 
seeking membership in the EU. As early as August 2001 it overtook the other 
candidate states in the number of ‘chapters’ of EU law it had closed during accession 
talks and now fulfils all the criteria for membership.2 According to the road map of 
the European Commission endorsed by the European Council, the negotiations should 
be concluded before the end of 2002 and Cyprus is expected to be part of the first 
wave of acceding countries. But at the same time, despite the fact that the EU has 
repeatedly underlined that a political settlement would facilitate the accession of 
Cyprus (although this is not a precondition for accession), the necessary progress 
needed to make way for a solution has not yet been achieved. Moreover, it is far from 
clear that negotiations can be continued in earnest, let alone produce a solution that 
can avoid a “derailing” with the EU before 2004.  
                                                
2 For details on the accession talks refer to http://www.ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm  
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While this seems rather convoluted, as things stand at the moment there is one 
logical conclusion to be drawn: a Cyprus settlement and EU membership are mutually 
exclusive.  So the EU now finds itself in a particularly difficult position. Brussels is 
no longer convinced that the prospect of membership, which proved to be a strong 
incentive for many Central and Eastern European countries to proceed with political 
and economic transformation and the resolution of territorial and ethnic disputes, can 
produce similar results in Cyprus. However, although some leading EU figures doubt 
the wisdom of admitting a politically divided Cyprus, hamstrung by Greece’s veto 
threat over the enlargement process,3 the EU apparently cannot disengage. 
Speaking in Athens in March 2002, EU enlargement Commissioner Günter 
Verheugen said that Cyprus’ EU accession, with or without a political solution, would 
strengthen stability in the eastern Mediterranean, dismissing Turkey’s claim to the 
opposite. He also added that Cyprus is expected to sign its entry into the bloc by 2003, 
together with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.  What, therefore, appears increasingly likely to happen is 
that, if the political problem is not regulated with the completion of the accession 
negotiations, Cyprus will accede as a whole de jure to the EU, while the 
implementation of the acquis communautaire would cover de facto the part of the 
island controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus.  Such an outcome will 
inevitably have multiple political and security implications not only for Cyprus and 
the entire eastern Mediterranean region but also for the EU, particularly on a range of 
issues regarding EU-Turkey relations and the ESDP. 
 
VI. The Accession of Cyprus and the Future of EU-Turkey Relations 
 
Under pressure from the West, political and military elites in Turkey are split over 
how to react in the case Cyprus joins the EU before a political settlement is reached.  
There is a real danger, however, that if this is to happen Ankara will react emotionally 
and annex the northern part of Cyprus, something which, according to Commissioner 
Verheugen, will result in the cancellation of Turkey’s accession process. There is of 
course also the possibility that Ankara will itself withdraw its application for EU 
                                                
3 Greece, on the other hand, has repeatedly hinted that no enlargement can proceed without the 
inclusion of Cyprus. Athens could veto the accession of any other cand idates should Cyprus be 
omitted. 
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membership.  Either way, the EU-Turkey relations will be sent into a new tailspin.  
The developments will also determine if there is an element of truth in the conspiracy 
theories, which suggest that, despite the two sides’ official rhetoric, the EU is simply 
pretending to offer membership to Turkey while for its part Turkey is merely 
pretending to negotiate accession to the EU. 
Although they would be reluctant to admit it publicly, the suspension or 
withdrawal of Turkey’s application following the accession of Cyprus could come as 
a relief to many people in the EU.  There is little doubt that Turkey’s continued failure 
to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria,4 particularly the condition which calls for “stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities” (Copenhagen European Council 1993: 17), has played 
into the hands of those who would not want Turkey to join the EU under any 
circumstances.  Special cooperation agreements and a customs union between the EU 
and Turkey are one thing, but full membership does not look like a prospect existing 
members would exactly relish. At the same time, there is a suspicion that even those 
in the EU who sincerely support Ankara’s candidacy do so in the knowledge that 
Turkish accession will not occur in the foreseeable future. In case Turkey’s 
application is suspended or withdrawn, these same people will be spared the need to 
consider not just the social and cultural consequences but also the economic impact5 
of taking in a (mostly Muslim) population of 65 million (two thirds of which live to 
the east of Ankara) with a per capita income of about 15 per cent of the EU average.6 
But looking at the other side of the coin one must also acknowledge that the long- 
lasting Turkish desire to be allowed into the “European family of nations” runs 
parallel to a deep-rooted suspicion of European motives, which has intensified rather 
than diminished as Turkey has edged closer to EU membership. From the Turkish 
perspective, the EU’s continued insistence that Ankara implement the freedoms 
envisaged under the Copenhagen criteria is not only baffling, but also suspect. At 
best, such insistence is seen as camouflage for religious and cultural prejudice. But 
                                                
4 In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council ruled that an application for membership could take place 
as soon as an applicant is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and 
political conditions required.  
5 Should Turkey join the EU, free movement of labour would see Turkey ’s population flood Europe 
while the burden on the EU to give Turkey substantial amounts of economic aid (given that the country 
would qualify for almost all kinds of subsidi es) would be massive.  
6 While Turkey is by far the largest of all the candidate countries, it must be noted that it is not the 
poorest (in terms of GDP it is ahead of Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia).  
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many in both the Turkish political establishment and the country’s powerful military 
genuinely believe that the EU is driven by more sinister motives.  
The changes Turkey must make before membership talks can even commence 
under an “Accession Partnership Accord” are in many ways much tougher than for 
others, because of the sheer scale of its problems. There is, therefore, a genuine fear in 
Turkey that measures such as the lifting of restrictions on freedom of expression and 
the allowance of Kurdish-language broadcasts and education (both of which are long-
standing European demands) would encourage Islamist and Kurdish nationalist 
sentiments, unleashing forces which would tear Turkish society apart. It should, 
nevertheless, also be stated that by granting such rights and freedoms, for the sake of 
EU membership, the powerful ruling elite of Turkey (and particularly the Turkish 
General Staff whose domination of security policy has often been cited by the EU as 
incompatible with the membership criteria regarding civilian control of the military), 
which has a firm grip on the country, would in effect be signing its own demise. 
The impending accession of Cyprus might, therefore, provide the perfect 
opportunity for both the EU and Turkey to take a step back and rethink their positions 
vis-à -vis each another. How far and in which direction these relations will develop 
depends on how Turkey will act and how the EU will respond to Turkey. The hope, 
however, must remain that calm heads will prevail, that the Turkish reaction once 
Cyprus joins the EU will not sound the death knell of the country’s own EU 
aspirations and that a (temporary) formula can be found which would enable Turkey 
and the EU to coexist and cooperate without the cohabitation that comes with full 
membership. In the medium term such an arrangement would give Turkey time to 
reconcile its desire for accession with its reluctance to embrace the values on which 
membership is supposedly based. 
 
VII. The Accession of Cyprus and the Future of the ESDP 
 
A lot has been written about the need for Europe to unite under one roof with a 
common law and institutions, a common currency, a single foreign policy and single 
defence arrangements if it is to fulfil its aspirations and become a strategic power in 
the world. But while the first three issues are either already in place or making steady 
progress, the matter of the proposed common EU military force is by and large 
bedevilled by the Cyprus problem (and the Greece-Turkey disputes over the Aegean).  
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Despite the fact that all the parties involved in the issue promised to do their best to 
put the ESDP arrangements in place in such a way so as to avoid friction between the 
EU and NATO, two organizations that have been the engine for the stabilization of 
Europe in the last fifty years, nothing concrete has yet been agreed. And there must be 
very little doubt that after the accession of Cyprus to the EU there might arise new 
complications which, in the worst case scenario, might even cause a transatlantic rift 
between the EU and the United States (US) in the approach to foreign affairs. 
One of the hallmarks of the Helsinki summit was the decision to create by 2003 
an independent 50,000 to 60,000 strong EU-led military capability. The European 
Council underlined its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to make 
decisions and, where NATO as a whole was not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-
led military operations in response to international crises.7 The EU’s proposed ESDP 
sought to give the EU the right to use NATO assets, without non-EU members of 
NATO (such as Turkey) having any effective say or veto in how they would be used. 
But Turkey’s concern for its own security raised a new difficulty with the EU that 
looked like being particularly hard to resolve. Ankara, where the powerful military 
establishment still played a central role, steadfastly raised its opposition to the EU’s 
nascent Rapid Reaction Force. Turkey, a NATO member, demanded full decision-
making powers in operations that could affect Turkish interests while the EU was 
only willing to offer the Turks the right to ‘close consultation’. Having been denied 
full participation in ESDP and fearing the possible involvement of the envisioned 
European force in Cyprus and the disputes with Greece over territorial waters in the 
Aegean, Turkey vetoed EU-NATO arrangements and blocked EU access to NATO 
assets and planning capabilities. 
Annoyed by the Turkish veto, the Belgian and French foreign ministers warned 
Turkey that nothing could prevent progress toward a common European defence. The 
German government went further and hinted that Ankara’s opposition to ESDP could 
dampen EU enthusiasm for future economic assistance. But not even a personal 
appeal from then US President Bill Clinton was enough to sway the Turks from their 
position. Turkey’s announcement in December 2001 that it was withdrawing its 
objections to the formation of a European defence force came only after it had been 
                                                
7 The EU could not go ahead without NATO’s consent, partly to avoid undermining it, and partly 
because it needed to borrow its weapons and equipment.  
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assured by the UK that the force would not be deployed in Cyprus or (other) disputes 
between Greece and Turkey. Greece, however, refused to accept this agreement, 
which became known as the ‘Ankara document’. Greek officials said that the fact that 
Turkey would have a say on how the EU force would operate in the Aegean or in 
relation to Cyprus would be to the detriment of Greece’s national interests. Greek 
Prime Minister Costas Simitis firmly resisted pressure from NATO Secretary-General 
Lord George Robertson and EU High Representative for Security and Defence Javier 
Solana to accept the ‘Ankara document’ and repeatedly stated that Greece could not 
accept the text. The deal under which Ankara agreed to allow the EU force to use 
NATO assets has, therefore, rapidly become a problem between Greece, EU and 
NATO and the disagreement has frozen the establishment of the force. 
Legions of diplomats are now working overtime to try to solve this knotty 
problem.  EU and NATO officials have expressed the hope that the issue will be 
solved before NATO’s conference in Prague in November 2002 so that the new EU 
force takes command of peacekeeping operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia when US troops pull out later in the year. Such expectations, nonetheless, 
might as well be the triumph of hope over experience. It is evident that the impending 
signing of the agreement for the accession of Cyprus will further complicate the issue. 
If the developments lead to a new crisis in EU-Turkey relations, the EU might go 
ahead with its plans for an independent EU military force but, this time around, 
without NATO’s consent. Such a decision, however, would effectively limit the 
exercise of American power in Europe.  It would, therefore, raise further questions as 
to how far a larger European regional order will have broader responsibilities or 
ambitions, something of course which is dependent on its relationship with the US. 
The relationship between the EU and NATO is fundamentally about the US and its 
position in Europe. And the question that no-one can answer at the moment is as to 
whether the EU can emerge as the main security organization for a larger Europe or 
whether NATO will remain as such. Would the ESDP attempt to replace NATO in the 
domain of security and defence? How would the EU respond to US (often hegemonic) 
foreign policy in the face of the forthcoming changes in Europe?  Most of these issues 
would likely be decided on how relations between the larger EU and the US develop. 
But the fact of the matter remains that Cyprus might be one of the factors that will 
help the pendulum swing one way or another. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
It is rather optimistic to expect that conditions will be conducive to a Cyprus 
settlement as we approach the signing of a full EU membership agreement. It is, 
therefore, likely that with the completion of the accession negotiations, Cyprus would 
accede as a whole de jure to the EU, while the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire would cover de facto the part of the island which is under the control 
of the internationally recognized government of the Republic of Cyprus. This 
development will have multiple implications not only for the region but the entire 
European continent, especially if Turkey reacts in a way that would place the larger 
European enlargement project in jeopardy.   
Everyone must hope that Turkey will not overreact once the accession 
negotiations of Cyprus are completed and, thus, risk its own application for 
membership. If this happens, however, it might be possible that both the EU and 
Turkey decide that they can still work together albeit without the cohabitation which 
comes with full membership. In case the accord on EU-NATO relations was again 
blocked by Turkey as a reaction to the accession of Cyprus, the EU would have to 
think seriously about ways of getting round the problem. One possibility would be for 
the EU to strengthen its links with national planning staffs. It might be possible for the 
EU to run an autonomous operation through drawing on the expertise of such national 
planners.  Yet, such a solution would certainly meet the scepticism of the US and in 
turn might force the redefinition of the EU-US relations. 
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